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Recombinant property is a form of organizational hedging in which 
actors respond to uncertainty by diversifying assets, redefining and 
recombining resources. It is an attempt to hold resources that can 
be justified by more than one legitimating principle. Property trans- 
formation in postsocialist Hungary involves the decentralized reor- 
ganization of assets and the centralized management of liabilities. 
Together they blur the boundaries of public and private, the bound- 
aries of enterprises, and the boundedness of justificatory principles. 
Enterprise-level field research, data on the ownership structure of 
Hungary's 220 largest enterprises and banks, and an examination 
of the government's recent debt consolidation programs uggest the 
emergence of a distinctively East European capitalism that will 
differ as much from West European capitalisms as do contemporary 
East Asian variants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Sociology began as a science of transition, founded at our century's turn 
on studies of the epochal shifts from tradition to modernity, rural to 
urban society, gemeinschaft to gesellschaft, feudalism to capitalism, and 
mechanical to organic solidarity. For the founders of sociology, the crisis 
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besetting European societies at the end of the 19th century was diagnosed 
as a normative and institutional vacuum. The old order regulated by 
tradition had passed, but a new moral order had not yet been established. 
During our own fin de siecle, not the crumbling of traditional structures 
but the collapse of communism gives new life to the transition problem- 
atic (Nee 1989; Lipset 1990; and see Alexander [1994] for an extended 
critical discussion). Within that problematic, the present is studied as an 
approximation of a designated future (Blanchard, Froot, and Sachs 
1994), risking an underlying teleology in which concepts are driven by 
hypostasized end-states. In the framework of transitology, the transi- 
tional present is a period of dislocation as society undergoes the passage 
through a liminal state suspended between one social order and another 
(Bunce and Csanadi 1993), each conceived as a stable equilibrium orga- 
nized around a coherent and more or less unitary logic. 
But is ours still the century of transition? And is that model of social 
change, so formative in the launching of sociology, still adequate for 
understanding the momentous changes in contemporary Eastern Europe? 
Difficult o assimilate within the transition problematic are the numer- 
ous studies from Eastern Europe documenting parallel and contradictory 
logics in which ordinary citizens were already experiencing, for a decade 
prior to 1989, a social world in which various domains were not inte- 
grated coherently (Gaibor 1979, 1986; Szelenyi 1988; Stark 1986, 1989; 
Rona-Tas 1994).2 Through survey research and ethnographic studies, 
researchers have identified a multiplicity of social relations that did not 
conform to officially prescribed hierarchical patterns. These relations of 
reciprocity and marketlike transactions were widespread inside the so- 
cialist sector as well as in the "second economy" and stemmed from the 
contradictions of attempting to "scientifically manage" an entire national 
economy. At the shop-floor level, shortages and supply bottlenecks led 
to bargaining between supervisors and informal groups; at the manage- 
rial level, the task of meeting plan targets required a dense network of 
informal ties that cut across enterprises and local organizations; and the 
allocative distortions of central planning produced the conditions for the 
predominantly part-time ntrepreneurship of the second economies that 
differed in scope, density of network connections, and conditions of legal- 
ity across the region (Gaibor 1979; Kornai 1980; Sabel and Stark 1982; 
Szelenyi 1988). 
The existence of parallel structures (however contradictory and frag- 
mentary) in these informal and interfirm networks that "got the job 
2 East European scholars have long argued that social change is a transformational 
reshaping of enduring structures exhibiting multiplicity rather than uniformity (Kon- 
rad and Szelenyi 1979; Szuics 1985; Staniszkis 1993; Szelenyi 1994). 
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done" means that the collapse of the formal structures of the socialist 
regime does not result in an institutional vacuum. Instead, we find the 
persistence of routines and practices, organizational forms and social ties, 
that can become assets, resources, and the basis for credible commitments 
and coordinated actions in the postsocialist period (Bourdieu 1990; Nel- 
son and Winter 1982). In short, in place of disorientation, we find the 
metamorphosis of sub-rosa organizational forms and the activation of 
preexisting networks of affiliation. 
If, by the 1980s, the societies of Eastern Europe were decidedly not 
sys-tems organized around a single logic, they are not likely in the post- 
socialist epoch to become, any more or less than our own, societies with 
a single system identity. Change, even fundamental change, of the social 
world is not the passage from one order to another but rearrangements 
in the patterns of how multiple orders are interwoven. Organizational 
innovation in this view is not replacement but recombination (Schum- 
peter 1934). 
Thus, we examine how actors in the postsocialist context are rebuilding 
organizations and institutions not on the ruins but with the ruins of 
communism as they redeploy available resources in response to their 
immediate practical dilemmas. Such a conception of path dependence 
does not condemn actors to repetition or retrogression,3 for it is through 
adjusting to new uncertainties by improvising on practiced routines that 
new organizational forms emerge (Nelson and Winter 1982; White 1993; 
Kogut and Zander 1992; Sabel and Zeitlin 1996). The analysis that fol- 
lows emphasizes the organizational reflexivity that is possible when actors 
maneuver across a multiplicity of legitimating principles and strategically 
exploit ambiguities in the polyphony of accounts of work, value, and 
justice that compose modern society (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991; 
White 1992; Stark 1990; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Breiger 1995). 
A New Type of Mixed Economy? 
This article examines the recombinatory logic of organizational innova- 
tion in the restructuring of property relations in Hungary. It asks, Are 
recombinant processes resulting in a new type of mixed economy as a 
distinctively East European capitalism? 
For more than 30 years, policy analysts in Eastern Europe debated 
the "correct mix of plan and market" (Stark and Nee 1989). By the 
3 See, by contrast, Burawoy and Krotov's account of change as retrogression: "Our 
case study suggests that with the withering away of the party state the Soviet economy, 
far from collapsing or transforming itself, has assumed an exaggerated version of its 
former self' (1992, p. 34). 
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mid-1980s in Hungary, the debate had shifted to the correct mix of "pub- 
lic and private property" as the earlier sacrosanct status of collective 
property eroded with the growth of the second economy. It was thus, in 
the waning years of state socialism, that Gaibor (1986) and Szelenyi (1988) 
coined the term "socialist mixed economy" to designate the new eco- 
nomic configuration.4 Meanwhile, Stark (1989, p. 168), amplifying Ga- 
bor's call to acknowledge a mixed economy "as a viable hybrid form 
and not as inherently unstable and necessarily transitional," questioned 
nonetheless whether the concept of mixed economy was adequate to grasp 
the emergent phenomena of late socialism. On the basis of field research 
on "intrapreneurial" subcontracting units in Hungarian firms, I argued 
that aspects of emergent private property were not respecting the bound- 
aries of the second economy but were being fused with public ownership 
inside the socialist firm resulting in a "diversification of property forms." 
Identifying "hybrid mixtures of public ownership and private initiative" 
(Stark 1989, pp. 167-68) I argued that, instead of a mixed economy with 
well-bounded public and private sectors, analysis should begin to address 
the growing plurality of "mixed property forms" that transgressed and 
blurred traditional property boundaries. 
Scholars of economic reforms in China subsequently developed related 
concepts to analyze the fiscal reforms reshaping incentives among local 
governments giving rise to "township and village enterprises." Oi's 
(1992) concept of "local corporatism," Nee's (1992) "hybrid property," 
and Cui's (in press) notion of "moebius-strip ownership" each illumi- 
nated a particular facet of Chinese property reforms that supported the 
general conclusion that China's is not a simple mixed economy but a 
kaleidoscope of mixed public and private property forms. 
Of special relevance to my concerns is Walder's (1994) insight that 
property reform should not be equated with privatization. Walder argues 
that "clarification of property rights" in the Chinese fiscal reforms can 
yield performance nhancing incentives even while maintaining "public 
ownership" without privatization. Our analysis of the Hungarian case 
also demonstrates that property transformation can occur without con- 
ventional privatization.5 The difference, however, is that property trans- 
4 Szel6nyi (1978) argued that "mixture" characterized both East and West: whereas 
a redistributive welfare state mitigates inequalities produced by markets under ad- 
vanced capitalism, in state socialism subordinated marketlike institutions mitigate 
inequalities produced by the dominant redistributive mechanism. Elsewhere (Stark 
1986) I labeled this analytic method "mirrored opposition" and used it to analyze 
differences between capitalist and socialist internal labor markets. 
5 In her analysis of "political capitalism" in Poland, Staniszkis (1991) similarly identi- 
fies "hybrid forms" of "undefined dual status" in a variety of leasing forms and 
cost-shifting arrangements through which nomenclatura companies enjoy the benefits 
of property transformation without privatization. 
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formation in Hungary does not necessarily clarify property rights. As 
we shall see, the emerging new property forms in Hungary blur (1) the 
boundaries of public and private, (2) the organizational boundaries of 
enterprises, and (3) the boundedness of justificatory principles. To denote 
these processes of triple boundary blurring I adopt the term recombinant 
property. 
Recombinant property is a form of organizational hedging, or portfolio 
management, in which actors respond to uncertainty in the organiza- 
tional environment by diversifying their assets, redefining and recombin- 
ing resources. It is an attempt to hold resources that can be justified or 
assessed by more than one standard of measure. 
The distinctive variant of organizational hedging that is recombinant 
property in Hungary is produced in two simultaneous processes: Parallel 
to the decentralized reorganization of assets is the centralized manage- 
ment of liabilities. On the one hand, decentralized reorganization pro- 
duces the crisscrossing lines of interenterprise ownership networks; on 
the other, debt consolidation transforms private debt into public liability. 
Although these two dimensions are discussed separately, their simultane- 
ity gives distinctive shape to Hungarian property. The clash of competing 
ordering principles produces organizational diversity that can form a 
basis for greater adaptability but, at the same time, creates acute prob- 
lems of accountability. 
Data.-My arguments are based on data collected during an 11-month 
stay in Budapest in 1993-94. That research includes (1) field research in 
six Hungarian enterprises,6 (2) compilation of a data set on the ownership 
structure of Hungary's 200 largest corporations and top 25 banks,7 and 
(3) interviews with leading actors in banks, property agencies, political 
parties, and government ministries.' 
6 Three of these firms are among the 20 largest firms in Hungary and are at the core 
of Hungarian manufacturing inmetallurgy, electronics, and rubber products. Three 
are small and medium-size firms in plastics, machining, and industrial engineering. 
This field research was conducted in collaboration with Laszl6 Neumann and involved 
longitudinal nalysis of the same firms in which we had earlier studied an organiza- 
tional innovation of internal subcontracting inside the socialist enterprise (Stark 1986, 
1989, 1990; Neumann 1989). 
7 These data were augmented by ownership data drawn from the files of some 800 
firms under the portfolio management of the State Property Agency. 
8 A partial list of interviewees includes the former president of the National Bank; 
the former deputy-minister of the Ministry of Finance; executives of the four largest 
commercial banks and two leading investment banks; the former president of the 
,State Holding Corporation; directors, advisors, and officials of the State Property 
Agency; senior officials of the World Bank's Hungarian Mission; the chief economic 
advisors of the two major liberal parties; the president of the Federation of Hungarian 
Trade Unions; and leading officials of the Hungarian Socialist Party (who later as- 
cended to high-level positions in the new Socialist-Liberal coalition government). 
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PROPERTY TRANSFORMATION IN HUNGARY: 
THE POLICY DEBATE 
My point of departure is a question central to contemporary debates in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: By what means can private 
property become the typical form of property relations in economies over- 
whelmingly dominated by state ownership of productive assets? 
Much of that debate can be organized around two fundamental policy 
strategies. First, the institutionalization of private property can best be 
established by transferring assets from public to private hands. Despite 
differences in the specific methods designated for such privatization (e.g., 
sale vs. free distribution, etc.), the various proposals within this radical 
perspective share the assumption that the creation of a private sector 
begins with the existing state-owned enterprises, that is, the basic organi- 
zational units of the emergent market economy will be the preexisting 
but newly privatized enterprises. 
The second policy strategy argues from the perspective of institutional 
(and specifically, evolutionary) economics that, although slower, the more 
reliable road to institutionalizing private property rests in the develop- 
ment of a class of private proprietors. Instead of transferring the assets 
of a given organizational unit from one ownership form to another, public 
policy should lower barriers to entry for small and medium scale, genu- 
inely private ventures. This perspective typically looks to the existing 
second economy entrepreneurs a the basic organizational building block 
of an emergent market economy. 
Recent evidence suggests that Hungary is adopting neither a big bang 
approach nor the policy prescriptions of evolutionary economics. Con- 
trary to the optimistic scenarios of domestic politicians and Western econ- 
omists who foresaw a rapid transfer of assets from state-owned enter- 
prises to private ownership, the overwhelming bulk of the Hungarian 
economy remains state property. Two years after Prime Minister Jozsef 
Antall confidently announced that his new government would privatize 
more than 50% of state property by 1995, the director of the Privatization 
Research Institute functioning alongside the State Property Agency (SPA) 
estimated that only about 3% of the state-owned productive capital has 
been privatized (Mellar 1992). According to a recent study commissioned 
by the World Bank (Pistor and Turkewitz 1994), by mid-1994 the SPA 
had only sold about 11% of the value of its original portfolio. 
Contrary as well to the hopes of evolutionary economics, a considerable 
body of evidence now suggests that the second economy has not become 
a dynamic, legitimate private sector: Although the number of registered 
private ventures has skyrocketed, many are "dummy firms," tax evasion 
is pervasive, and many entrepreneurs (a majority in some categories) still 
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engage in private ventures only as a second job (Laky 1992; Gaibor 1994, 
1996). And although employment is slowly increasing in the sector, most 
researchers agree that the proportion of unregistered work (for which the 
state receives no social security payments and the employee receives no 
benefits) is increasing faster (Kornai 1992, p. 13). 
These tendencies together with new forms of corruption, extortion, 
and exploitation have prompted one researcher to label the transition as 
one "from second economy to informal economy" arguing that it is now, 
under these new conditions, that Latin American comparisons are more 
applicable to the Hungarian setting (Sik 1992). When private entrepre- 
neurs look to government policy, they see only burdensome taxation, 
lack of credits, virtually no programs to encourage regional or local devel- 
opment, and inordinate delays in payments for orders delivered to public- 
sector firms (Webster 1992; Kornai 1992). Through violations of tax 
codes, off-the-books payments to workers, and reluctance to engage in 
capital investment, much of the private sector is responding in kind 
(Gaibor 1996). Such government policies and private-sector esponses are 
clearly not a recipe for the development of a legitimate private sector as 
a dynamic engine of economic growth. 
THE DECENTRALIZED REORGANIZATION OF ASSETS 
Although they fail to correspond to the policy prescriptions of either big 
bang or evolutionary economics, significant property transformations are 
taking place in Hungary. Since 1989, there has been an explosion of new 
economic units. In table 1, we see that 
1. the number of state enterprises declined by about 60% from the 
end of 1988 to the middle of 1994; 
2. the number of incorporated shareholding companies (reszventar- 
sasag or RT) increased by more than 20-fold (from 116 to 2,679); 
and 
3. the number of limited liability companies (korlatolt felelossegii 
tarsasag or KFT) increased most dramatically from only 450 
units in 1988 to over 79,000 by the middle of 1994. 
Table 1 clearly indicates the sudden proliferation of new units in the 
Hungarian economy. But does the table provide a reliable map of prop- 
erty relations in contemporary Hungary? No, at least not if the data are 
forced into the dichotomous public/private categories that structure the 
discussion about property transformation i  the postsocialist countries. 
As we shall see, actors within the large formerly state firms are trans- 
forming property relations at the enterprise level. The results, however, 
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are not well-defined rights of private property, yet neither are they a 
continuation or reproduction of old forms of state ownership. 
New Forms of State Ownership 
Take first he shareholding companies (RTs) on line 2 of the table. Some 
of these corporations are private ventures newly established after the 
"system change." But many are the legal successors of the state-owned 
enterprises that would have been enumerated in the previous year on 
line 1 of the table. Through a mandatory process of "corporatization," 
the former state-owned enterprise transforms its legal organizational form 
into a shareholding company. The question, of course, is who is holding 
the shares? In most of these corporatized firms the majority of shares are 
held by the State Property Agency or the newly created State Holding 
Corporation (AV-Rt). That is, as "public" and "private" actors copar- 
ticipate in the new recombinant property forms, the nature and instru- 
ments of the "public" dimension change: Whereas "state ownership" 
in socialism meant unmediated and indivisible ownership by a state min- 
istry (e.g., Ministry of Industry), corporatization in postcommunism en- 
tails share ownership by one or another government agency responsible 
for state property. 
Such corporatization mandated by a privatization agency in the current 
context has some distinctive features of renationalization. In the 1980s, 
managers in Hungary (and workers in Poland) exercised de facto property 
rights. Although they enjoyed no rights over disposal of property, they 
did exercise rights of residual control as well as rights over residual in- 
come streams. In the 1990s, corporatization paradoxically involves efforts 
by the state to reclaim the actual exercise of the property rights that had 
devolved to enterprise-level actors. Ironically, the agencies responsible 
for privatization are acting as agents of etatization (Voszka 1992). 
The "trap of centralization" already well known in the region (Bruszt 
1988) stands as a warning, however, that the effective xercise of such 
centralized control varies inversely with the scope and the degree of direct 
intervention. One encounters, therefore, proposals for privatizing the 
asset management function. In such programs, the state retains the right 
to dispose of property but delegates its rights as shareholder to private 
consulting firms and portfolio management eams who oversee daily oper- 
ations and strategic decisions on a subcontracting or commission basis. 
Interenterprise Ownership 
The state is seldom, however, the sole shareholder of the corporatized 
firms. Who are the other shareholders of the RTs enumerated on line 2 of 
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table 1? To answer this question, I compiled a data set on the ownership 
structure of the largest 200 Hungarian corporations (ranked by sales).9 
These firms compose the "Top 200" of the 1993 listing of Figyeli, a 
leading Hungarian business weekly. Like their Fortune 500 counterparts 
in the United States, the Figyelo 200 firms are major players in the 
Hungarian economy employing an estimated 21% of the labor force and 
accounting for 37% of total net sales and 42% of export revenues (Figyelo 
1993). The data also include the top 25 Hungarian banks (ranked by 
assets). Ownership data were obtained directly from the Hungarian 
Courts of Registry where corporate files contain not only information on 
the company's officers and board of directors but also a complete list of 
the company's owners as of the 1993 annual shareholders' meeting. The 
data analyzed here are limited to the top 20 shareholders of each corpora- 
tion.10 In the Budapest Court of Registry and the 19 county registries, 
we were able to locate ownership files for 195 of the 2-00 corpora- 
tions and for all of the 25 banks, referred to below as the "Top 220" 
firms. 
Who holds the shares of these 220 largest enterprises and banks? I 
found some form of state ownership-with shares held by the AV-Rt, 
the SPA, or the institutions of local government (who had typically ex- 
changed their real estate holdings for enterprise shares)-present in the 
overwhelming majority (71%) of these enterprises and banks. More sur- 
prisingly, given the relatively short time since the "system change" in 
1989-90, we found 36 companies (i.e., more than 16% of this population) 
in majority foreign ownership. Hungarian private individuals (summed 
down the top 20 owners) hold at least 25% of the shares of only 12 of 
these largest enterprises and banks. 
Most interesting from the perspective of this article is the finding of 
87 cases in which another Hungarian company is among the 20 largest 
shareholders. In 42 of these cases the other Hungarian companies to- 
9 Such data collection is not a simple matter where capital markets are poorly devel- 
oped. There is no Hungarian Moody's and certainly no corporate directory equivalent 
to Industrial Groupings in Japan or Keiretsu no Kenkyu (see, e.g., Gerlach and 
Lincoln 1992). The labor-intensive solution has been to gather that data directly from 
the Hungarian Courts of Registry. My thanks to Lajos Vekas, professor of law, 
ELTE, and Rector of the Institute for Advanced Study, Collegium Budapest, for his 
interventions to secure access to these data and to Szabolcs Kemeny and Jonathan 
Uphoff or assistance in data collection. 
10 This 20-owner limitation is a convention adopted in research on intercorporate 
ownership in East Asia (Gerlach and Lincoln 1992; Hoshi 1994). In the Hungarian 
economy where only 37 firms are traded on the Budapest stock exchange and where 
corporate shareholding is not widely dispersed among hundreds of small investors, 
the 20-owner estriction allows us to account for at least 90% of the shares held in 
virtually every company. 
1002 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Fri, 06 Mar 2015 18:10:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium: Stark 
gether hold a clear majority (50% plus one share). Thus, by the most 
restrictive definition, almost 20% of our Top 220 companies are unambig- 
uous cases of interenterprise ownership; and we find some degree of 
interenterprise ownership in almost 40% of these large companies. 
Figure 1 presents two discrete networks formed through such interen- 
terprise ownership. Arrows indicate directionality in which a given firm 
holds shares in another large enterprise. Weak ties (shareholdings with 
other firms that do not have at least one other tie, whether as owner or 
owned, to any other firm in the network) are not displayed.1" The rela- 
tions depicted in the figure, we emphasize, are the direct horizontal ties 
among the very largest enterprises-the superhighways, so to speak, of 
Hungarian corporate networks. The diagrams presented in figure 1 indi- 
cate a different way of mapping the social space of property transforma- 
tion than that suggested in table 1. Whereas table 1 grouped entities 
according to their legal corporate status, here we trace not the distribu- 
tion of attributes but the patterns of social ties. 
In analyzing the relational dynamics of recombinant property, we now 
shift our focus from the corporate thoroughfares linking the large enter- 
prises to examine the local byways linking spin-off properties within the 
gravitational field of large enterprises. 
Corporate Satellites 
We turn thus to the form with the most dramatic growth during the 
postsocialist period, the newly established limited liability companies 
(KFT), enumerated on line 3 of table 1. Some of these KFTs are genu- 
inely private entrepreneurial ventures. But many of these limited liability 
companies are not entirely distinct from the transformed shareholding 
companies examined above. In fact, the formerly socialist enterprises 
have been active founders and continue as current owners of the newly 
incorporated units. 
The basic process of this property transformation is one of decentral- 
ized reorganization: Under the pressure of enormous debt, declining 
sales, and threats of bankruptcy (or, in cases of more prosperous enter- 
prises, to forestall takeovers as well as to increase autonomy from state 
ministries) directors of many large enterprises are breaking up their firms 
(along divisional, factory, departmental, or even workshop lines) into 
numerous joint stock and limited liability companies. It is not uncommon 
11 The total pattern of strong and weak ties will be examined in a later study that 
uses block-model analysis, tests for bank centrality, and assesses the relationship 
between ownership ties and director interlocks. The purpose of that study will be to 
identify the major corporate groupings in the Hungarian economy. 
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FIG. 1.-Two interenterprise ownership networks among large Hungarian 
firms (based on data gathered from corporate files of 200 largest enterprises and 
top 25 banks in Hungarian Courts of Registry). 
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FIG. 2. -Corporate satellites at Heavy Metal (based on data from internal 
company documents). 
to find virtually all of the activities of a large public enterprise distributed 
among 15-20 such satellites orbiting around the corporate headquarters. 
As newly incorporated entities with legal identities, these new units 
are nominally independent-registered separately, with their own direc- 
tors and separate balance sheets. But on closer inspection, their status 
in practice is semiautonomous. An examination of the computerized rec- 
ords of the Budapest Court of Registry indicates, for example, that the 
controlling shares of these corporate satellites are typically held by the 
public enterprises themselves. This pattern is exemplified by the case of 
one of Hungary's largest metallurgy firms represented in figure 2. As we 
see in that figure, "Heavy Metal," an enormous shareholding company 
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in the portfolio f the State Holding Corporation, is the majority share- 
holder of 26 of its 40 corporate satellites. 
Like Saturn's rings, Heavy Metal's satellites revolve around the giant 
corporate planet in concentric orbits. Near the center are the core metal- 
lurgy units, hot-rolling mills, energy, maintenance, and strategic plan- 
ning units held in a kind of geosynchronous orbit by 100% ownership. 
In the next ring, where the corporate headquarters holds roughly 50%- 
99% of the shares, are the cold-rolling mills, wire and cable production, 
the oxygen facility, galvanizing and other finishing treatments, special- 
ized castings, quality control, and marketing units. As this listing sug- 
gests, these satellites are linked to each other and to the core units by 
ties of technological dependence. Relations between the middle-ring satel- 
lites and the company center are marked by the center's recurrent efforts 
to introduce stricter accounting procedures and tighter financial controls. 
These attempts are countered by the units' efforts to increase their auton- 
omy-coordinated through personal ties and formalized in the biweekly 
meetings of the "Club of KFT Managing Directors." 
The satellites of the outer ring are even more heterogeneous in their 
production profiles (construction, industrial services, computing, ceram- 
ics, machining) and are usually of lower levels of capitalization. Units of 
this outer ring are less fixed in Heavy Metal's gravitational field: some 
have recently entered and some seem about to leave. Among the new 
entrants are some of Heavy Metal's domestic customers. Unable to collect 
receivables, Heavy Metal exchanged interenterprise d bt for equity in its 
clients, preferring that these meteors be swept into an orbit rather than 
be lost in liquidation. Among those satellites launched from the old state 
enterprise are some for which Heavy Metal augments its less than major- 
ity ownership with leasing arrangements to keep centrifugal forces in 
check. 
The corporate satellites among the limited liability companies enumer- 
ated on line 3 of table 1 are, thus, far from unambiguously "private" 
ventures; yet neither are they unmistakably "statist" residues of the 
socialist past. Property shares in most corporate satellites are not limited 
to the founding enterprise. Top- and mid-level managers, professionals, 
and other staff can be found on the lists of founding partners and current 
owners. Such private persons rarely acquire complete ownership of the 
corporate satellite, preferring to use their insider knowledge to exploit 
the ambiguities of institutional coownership. The corporate satellites are 
thus partially a result of the hedging and risk-sharing strategies of indi- 
vidual managers. We might ask why a given manager would not want 
to acquire 100% ownership in order to obtain 100% of the profit, but 
from the perspective of a given manager the calculus instead is, "Why 
acquire 100% of the risk if some can be shared with the corporate cen- 
1006 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Fri, 06 Mar 2015 18:10:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium: Stark 
ter?" With ambiguous interests and divided loyalties, these risk-sharing 
(or risk-shedding) owner/managers are organizationally hedging (Sabel 
1990). 12 
Not uncommonly, these individuals are joined in mixed ownership by 
other joint stock companies and limited liability companies-sometimes 
by independent companies, often by other KFTs in a similar orbit around 
the same enterprise, and frequently by shareholding companies or KFTs 
spinning around some other enterprise with lines of purchase or supply 
to the corporate unit (Voszka 1991). Banks also participate in this form 
of recombinant property. In many cases, the establishment of KFTs and 
other new corporate forms is triggered by enterprise debt. In the reorgani- 
zation of the insolvent firms, the commercial banks (whose shares as joint 
stock companies are still predominantly state owned) become sharehold- 
ers of the corporate satellites by exchanging debt for equity. 
We have used the term "corporate satellite" to designate this instance 
of recombinant property. An exact (but cumbersome) terminology reflects 
the complex, intertwined character of property relations in Hungary: a 
limited liability company owned by private persons, by private ventures, 
and by other limited liability companies owned by joint stock companies, 
banks, and large public enterprises owned by the state. The new property 
forms thus find horizontal ties of cross-ownership intertwined with verti- 
cal ties of nested holdings. 
Metamorphic Networks 
The recombinant character of Hungarian property is a function not only 
of the direct (horizontal) ownership ties among the largest firms and of 
their direct (vertical) ties to their corporate satellites but also of the net- 
work properties of the full ensemble of direct and indirect ties linking 
entities, irrespective of their attributes (large, small, or of various legal 
forms) in a given configuration. The available data do not allow us to 
present a comprehensive map of these complex relations. Records in the 
Courts of Registry include documents on the owners of a particular firm, 
12 Many of these mid-level managers had experiences in the 1980s with an organiza- 
tional precursor of the present recombinant forms-the intraenterprise partner- 
ships-in which semiautonomous subcontracting units used enterprise equipment o 
produce goods or services during the "off hours" (Stark 1986, 1989). Like "second 
economy" producers who continued to hold a job in state enterprises, these intrapre- 
neurial units were a widespread result of hedging strategies in the Hungarian econ- 
omy. Some of these partnerships were- scarcely disguised rent-seeking schemes that 
privatized profit streams and left expenses with the state-owned enterprise. Others 
creatively redeployed resources from diverse parts of the shop floor and regrouped, 
as well, the informal norms of reciprocity with the technical norms of professionals. 
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AV-Rt ~ -BankSP 
0 Kft~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f 
FIG. 3. A metamorphic network (based on data from Heavy Metal internal 
documents, SPA files, corporate files, and the Budapest Court of Registry). 
but enterprises are not required to report the companies in which they 
hold a stake. However, on the basis of enterprise-level field research, 
examination of public records at the SPA, and interviews with bankers 
and executives of consulting firms we have been able to reconstruct par- 
tially such networks as represented in figure 3. 
For orientation in this graphic space, we position figure 3 in relation 
to figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 presented interenterprise ownership networks 
formed through horizontal ties directly linking large enterprises. Figure 
2 zoomed in on the corporate satellites of a single large enterprise. With 
figure 3 we pull back to examine a fragment of a broader interenterprise 
ownership network bringing into focus the ties that link corporate satel- 
lites to each other and that form the indirect ties among heterogeneous 
units in a more loosely coupled network. 13 
13 The metamorphic network is not a simple summation of the set of horizontal and 
vertical ties: to categorically label the ties between a given KFT and a given RT as 
"vertical" would be to ignore the ways the KFTs are recombining properties. To the 
extent hat network qualities (network properties, in the double sense of the term) are 
emergent in the metamorphic network, the language of horizontal and vertical should 
give place to more appropriate descriptors such as extensivity, density, tight or loose 
coupling, strong or weak ties, structural holes, and the like (Breiger and Pattison 
1986; Burt 1992). 
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I label this emergent form of recombinant property a metamorphic 
network. Here we see that the limited liability companies that began as 
corporate spin-offs are oriented through ownership ties either to more 
than one shareholding company and/or to other limited liability compa- 
nies. In the metamorphic network, actors recognize the network proper- 
ties of their interdependent assets and regroup them across formal organi- 
zational boundaries. These creative regroupings fail to respect the 
organizational boundaries between enterprises as well as the boundaries 
between public and private. 
With few exceptions (Sabel and Prokop 1994), the literature on postso- 
cialist property transformation (most of it confined to "privatization") 
assumes that the economic unit to be restructured is the individual enter- 
prise. But the identification of interfirm networks suggests that policies 
and practices aimed at restructuring should target not the isolated firm 
but networks offirms. Such an alternative strategy of restructuring recog- 
nizes that assets and liabilities have distinctive network properties. 
The industrial structure of the socialist economy commonly grouped, 
within a single enterprise, assets that were incompatible (except within 
the logic of central planning). Merely separating or simply regrouping 
such assets within existing enterprises alone (on a firm-by-firm basis) 
cannot equal the more fruitful recombinations of complementary assets 
across a set of firms. Restructuring via recombinant networks thus opens 
the possibilities of increasing the value of existing assets through their 
recombination. This regrouping does not necessarily imply bringing inter- 
dependent assets under the common ownership umbrella of a hierarchi- 
cally organized enterprise. As such, Hungarian recombinant property 
provides examples of intercorporate networks as alternatives to a dichoto- 
mously forced choice between markets and hierarchies. 
THE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF LIABILITIES 
In the previous section, we examined the decentralized reorganization of 
assets. Property transformation, however, involves not only assets and 
rights but also liabilities and obligations. In this section, we analyze what 
happens in a postsocialist economy when actors are called to account for 
enterprise debt. 
Taking the Last Small Steps 
The liabilities management story begins in 1991 when the Hungarian 
government fundamentally modified three important laws regulating the 
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accounting of assets and liabilities in an attempt to maintain its lead in 
regional competition for foreign investments and international credits. 
Hungary's comparative advantage, it appeared, was its gradualism, 
which, across the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, had yielded a full range 
of marketlike institutions. Admittedly, these were not the institutions of 
a market economy, but they were close; and so, the government reasoned, 
why not take the last small steps? As the pioneer attempt o bring postso- 
cialist practice in full conformity with Western accounting and banking 
standards, the new measures could be cast as a bold move when appeal- 
ing to international ending agencies. But because they were not big 
steps, the new measures could gain external egitimation without creating 
a domestic shock. 
Thus, the new Accounting Law of 1991 (which took effect on January 
1, 1992) required enterprises to switch to Western-style accounting princi- 
ples. The simultaneously enacted, tough new Western-style Bankruptcy 
Act similarly contained stiff personal penalties for directors of enterprises 
that failed to file for bankruptcy after the accountants (using the new 
accounting principles) sounded the alarm. At the same time, the new Act 
on Financial Institutions introduced in December 1991 was designed to 
put Hungary's commercial banks on a Western footing. In particular, 
the reserve requirements for measuring capital-adequacy ratios were 
modified and the securities and other financial instruments for provi- 
sioning against qualified loans were respecified. 
The last small steps proved to be a leap into the abyss. Already reeling 
from the collapse of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assis- 
tance) markets, enterprise directors now learned from their accountants 
that the new accounting practices were coloring the companies' books 
even redder than expected. By the end of 1992, over 10,000 bankruptcies 
and liquidation proceedings had been initiated-a figure 10 times higher 
than during the previous year when enterprises had experienced the worst 
shock of the collapsed Eastern markets (Bokros 1994). With one-third to 
one-half of enterprises in the red, the loss-making firms began to stop 
payment on their bank credits. By the end of 1992, the overdue loan 
stock of the banking system was 127 billion forints (1.5 billion in U.S. 
dollars) up 90% from the previous year (National Bank of Hungary 1992, 
p. 109). 
With thousands of firms filing for bankruptcy, the banks were forced 
by the new banking law to reclassify loans. The subsequent dramatic 
increase in the new legally required provisionings against poorly per- 
forming loans cut deeply into bank profits, slashed dividends and tax 
revenues from the banking sector to the state treasury, and turned the 
banks' capital-adequacy ratios from positive to negative. The banking 
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system was in crisis-first announced, no less, in the Financial Times of 
London (Denton 1993). 
From Small Steps to Big Bailouts 
The same government hat had launched an unintended financial shock 
now initiated a bold plan to save the banks. In its 1992 loan consolidation 
program, the government bought Ft 104.9 billion (about $1 billion) of 
qualified debt (almost all in the "bad" debt classification) involving 14 
banks and 1,885 companies. In a related move in early 1993, the govern- 
ment also purchased the bank debt of 11 giant enterprises (the so-called 
dirty dozen) for roughly $300 million. But the loan consolidation and 
enterprise recapitalization programs did not restore stability in the bank- 
ing sector. By September 1993, only nine months later, financial experts 
were estimating that loans in arrears had once again soared to 20% of 
total loan portfolios. And the 10 largest banks were again hovering at or 
below the 0% capital-adequacy ratio (a condition of technical insolvency). 
For the government, the new banking rules did not exclude bailing 
out banks and enterprises again and again. But the big bailout of 1993 
had a new twist. Instead of buying the debt from the banks, this time 
the government adopted a two-stage strategy of first recapitalizing the 
banks and then using the banks to work out the enterprise debt. By 
injecting enormous sums of fresh capital into the banks, the Ministry of 
Finance became the dominant shareholder of the large commercial 
banks. The first stage of the strategy, then, could be summarized in a 
phrase: Do not acquire the debt, acquire the banks. 
The second stage of the strategy was designed to harness the expertise 
of the banks to the service of the state. Because it was the banks, and 
not the state, that would be left holding the qualified debt, the banks 
would have an incentive to collect that debt, or at least the part they 
had not already written off their books. And they would do so, this time, 
not with the state as their sometime partner but with the state as their 
majority owner. But as Hungary's conservative-nationalist government 
should have learned from the earlier experience of state socialism, efforts 
to exercise control through direct ownership do not equal more effective 
state capacity. Banks have shown almost no willingness to use the consol- 
idation funds for actively restructuring firms; and, despite the assumption 
that the Ministry of Finance's ownership would yield control of the 
banks, the government has been almost entirely ineffective in monitoring 
how the banks use the recapitalization funds. 
The massive bailout programs were not, of course, without effects: At 
Ft 300 billion ($3 billion)-amounting to 10% of Hungarian GDP and 
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18.3% of the 1994 national budget (i.e., proportionally more than the 
U.S. savings and loan bailout)-the bailouts created a long queue of 
banks and firms with their hands out, reaching for the state's pock- 
etbook. 
Thus, at the same time that the corporate networks were engaged in 
the decentralized reorganization of assets, the Hungarian state attempted 
the centralized management of liabilities. That centralization has not 
left the decentralized processes untouched. From the perspective of the 
enterprises, "debt consolidation" triggers the organizational separation 
of debts from assets. The Hungarian government's attempt at the central- 
ized management of liabilities stimulates the networks to complement 
their strategies of risk spreading with new strategies of risk shedding. 
Two types of strategies can be identified, each based on the organiza- 
tional separation of assets and liabilities. In one type, assets are distrib- 
uted to the satellites and debts are centralized, increasing the enterprises' 
chances of inclusion in the government-funded debt consolidation. In the 
other, assets are closely held by the enterprise center and liabilities are 
distributed to the satellites where network ties and political connections 
manipulate proceedings in a Hungarian version of "bankruptcy for 
profit" (Akerlof and Romer [1993] coin the term in their study of state- 
managed liabilities in the U.S. savings and loan bailout). 
We thus see a new paternalism in Hungary: Whereas in the state 
socialist economy paternalism was based on the state's attempts to cen- 
trally manage assets (Kornai 1993a), in the first years of the postsocialist 
economy paternalism is based on the state's attempts to centrally manage 
liabilities. Centralized management of liabilities will not continue indefi- 
nitely, but the organizational dynamics of enterprises formed under the 
new paternalistic conditions are likely to have strong path-dependent 
effects. 
THE MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS OF RECOMBINANT PROPERTY 
In the highly uncertain organizational environment hat is the postso- 
cialist economy, relatively few actors (apart from institutional designers) 
set out with the aim to create a market economy. Many, indeed would 
welcome such an outcome. But their immediate goals are more prag- 
matic: at best to thrive, at least to survive. And so they strive to use 
whatever resources are available. That task is not so simple because one 
must first identify the relevant system of accounting in which something 
can exist as a resource. At the extreme, it is sometimes even difficult o 
distinguish a liability from an asset. If the liabilities of your organization 
(enterprise or bank) are big enough, perhaps they can be translated into 
qualifications for more resources. And what could be more worthless 
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than a bankrupted limited liability company-except, of course, if you 
have shed the risk to the banks (and then to the state) and put the assets 
in another form. Assets and liabilities have value not in themselves but 
in relation to legitimating principles. 
To examine how economic actors in the postsocialist setting maneuver 
not only through an ecology of organizations but also through a complex 
ecology of ordering principles we need to understand the doubly associa- 
tive character of assets. There are no free-floating resources. To exist as 
an asset a potential resource must be mobilizable through ties of associa- 
tion among persons (Granovetter 1985). And to be of value a potential 
resource must also have relative worth according to a standard of mea- 
sure. To be able to circulate through the ties that bind (and thus contrib- 
ute to that binding) an asset must be justified within a relatively stabilized 
network of categories that make up a legitimating principle (Thevenot 
1985; Boltanski and Thevenot 1991; Latour 1988; White 1992). Regroup- 
ing assets thus involves making new associations-not only by rearrang- 
ing social ties among persons and things but also by drawing on diverse 
repertoires of justificatory principles. 
To emphasize the patterned and the performative aspects of this pro- 
cess, I exploit a notion of accounts. Etymologically rich, the term simulta- 
neously connotes bookkeeping and narration. Both dimensions entail 
evaluative judgments, and each implies the other: Accountants prepare 
story lines according to established formulae, and in the accountings of 
a good storyteller we know what counts. In everyday life, we are all 
bookkeepers and storytellers. We keep accounts and we give accounts, 
and most important, we can all be called to account for our actions. 
When we make such an accounting, we draw on and reproduce social 
orders. We can competently produce justifications only in terms of estab- 
lished and recognized ordering principles, standards, and measures of 
evaluation. Because we do not simply give reasons but also have reasons 
for doing things, accounts are not simply retrospective; the imperative 
of justification (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991) structures what we do and 
not simply how we explain. We can never simply "calculate" because 
we must do so with units and instruments of measurement hat are deeply 
structured by accounts of what can be of value. We reproduce these units 
of measurement and we recalibrate the measuring instruments when we 
assert our worthiness, when we defer to the "more worthy," or when 
we denounce their status according to some other standard of evaluation. 
When we give an account, we affirm or challenge the ordering criteria 
according to which our actions (and/or those of others) have been or will 
be evaluated. And it is always within accounts that we "size up the 
situation," for not every form of worth can be made to apply and not 
every asset is in a form mobilizable for the situation. We evaluate the 
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situation by maneuvering to use scales that measure some types of worth 
and not others, thereby acting to validate some accounts and discredit 
others. 
The multiple accounts of recombinant property respond to and exploit 
the fundamental, though diffused, uncertainty about the organizational 
environment. In transformative economies, firms have to worry not sim- 
ply about whether there is demand for their products, or about the rate 
of return on their investment, or about the level of profitability but also 
about the very principle of selection itself. Thus, the question is not only 
"Will I survive the market test?"-but also, under what conditions is 
proof of worth on market principles neither sufficient nor necessary to 
survive? Because there are multiply operative, mutually coexistent prin- 
ciples of justification according to which you can be called on to give 
accounts of your actions, you cannot be sure what counts. By what 
proof and according to which principles of justification are you worthy 
to steward such and such resources? Because of this uncertainty, actors 
will seek to diversify their assets, to hold resources in multiple accounts. 
This ability to glide among principles and to produce multiple account- 
ings is an organizational hedging. It differs, however, from the kind of 
hedging to minimize risk exposure that we would find within a purely 
market logic-as, for example, when the shopkeeper who sells swimwear 
and suntan lotion also devotes some floor space to umbrellas. Instead of 
acting within a single regime of evaluation, these actors use organiza- 
tional hedging that crosses and combines disparate evaluative principles. 
Recombinant property is a particular kind of portfolio management. It 
is an attempt o have a resource that can be justified or assessed by more 
than one standard of measure (as, e.g., the rabbit breeder whose roadside 
stand advertises "pets and meat" in the documentary film, Roger and 
Me). In managing one's portfolio f justifications, one starts from the 
dictum: diversify our accounts. 
The adroit recombinant agent in the transformative economies of East 
Central Europe diversifies holdings in response to fundamental uncer- 
tainties about what can constitute a resource. Under conditions not sim- 
ply of market uncertainty but of organizational uncertainty, there can be 
multiple (and intertwined) strategies for survival-based in some cases 
on profitability but in others on eligibility. Where your success is judged, 
and the resources placed at your disposal determined, sometimes by your 
market share and sometimes by the number of workers you employ in a 
region; sometimes by your price-earnings ratio and sometimes by your 
"strategic importance"; and, when even the absolute size of your losses 
can be transformed into an asset yielding an income stream, you might 
be wise to diversify our portfolio, to be able to shift your accounts, to 
be equally skilled in applying for loans as in applying for job creation 
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subsidies, to have a multilingual command of the grammar of credit 
worthiness and the syntax of debt forgiveness. To hold recombinant 
property is to have such a diversified portfolio. 
To gain room for maneuver, actors court and even create ambiguity. 
They measure in multiple units, they speak in many tongues. They will 
be less controlled by others if they can be accountable (able to make 
credible accounts) to many.14 In so doing, they produce the polyphonic 
discourse of worth that is postsocialism. 
We can hear that polyphonic chorus in the diverse ways that firms 
justify their claims for participation in the debt-relief program. The fol- 
lowing litany of justifications are stylized versions of claims encountered 
in discussions with bankers, property agency officials, and enterprise 
directors: Our firm should be included in the debt relief program 
because we will forgive our debtors (i.e., our firm occupies a strategic place 
in a network of interenterprise debt) 
because we are truly credit worthy (i.e., if our liabilities are separated from 
our assets, we will again be eligible for more bank financing. Similar 
translations could be provided for each of the following justifications) 
because we employ thousands 
because our suppliers depend on us for a market 
because we are in your election district 
because our customers depend on our product inputs 
because we can then be privatized 
because we can never be privatized 
because we took big risks 
because we were prudent and did not take risks 
because we were planned in the past 
because we have a plan for the future 
because we export o the West 
because we export o the East 
because our product has been awarded an International Standards Quality 
Control Certificate 
because our product is part of the Hungarian ational heritage 
because we are an employee buy-out 
because we are a management buy-in 
because we are partly state-owned 
because we are partly privately held 
because our creditors drove us into bankruptcy when they loaned to us at 
higher than market rates to artificially raise bank profits in order to 
pay dividends into a state treasury whose coffers had dwindled when 
corporations like ourselves effectively stopped paying taxes. 
And so we must ask, into whose account and by which account will debt 
forgiveness flow? Or, in such a situation, is anyone accountable? 
14 See Padgett and Ansell (1993) for an analysis of such multivocality in another 
historical setting. 
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AN EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALISM? 
How are we to understand these unorthodox forms, these organizational 
"monsters" regrouping the seemingly incongruous? In this concluding 
section, we reconsider the three aspects of recombinant property (blurring 
of public and private, blurring of enterprise boundaries, and blurring 
the boundedness of legitimating principles) in terms of three underlying 
concepts-mixture, diversity, and complexity. 
Mixture 
Imagine two economies, each of equal parts public and private. In one, 
half the firms are fully private, half are fully public. In the other, every 
firm is half public, half private. Each is a "mixed economy." Yet is it 
likely that their dynamics will be the same?'5 No two economies closely 
approximate the thought experiment's ideal types; but it nonetheless puts 
in sharp relief the question What is the mix of the postsocialist mixed 
economy? 
My findings of corporate spin-offs and recombinant reorganization at 
the enterprise level, and of widespread public ownership combined with 
interenterprise ownership networks among the very largest enterprises, 
challenges the assumption, widely held on all sides of the privatization 
debate, that postsocialist economies can be adequately represented in a 
two-sector model. That analytic shortcoming cannot be remedied by 
more precise specification of the boundary between public and private: 
the old property divide has been so eroded that what might once have 
been a distinct boundary line is now a recombinant zone. Hungary is a 
postsocialist mixed economy not because of a simple dualism of well- 
bounded state-owned firms in one sector and privately owned firms in 
another but because many firms themselves exploit aspects of public and 
private property relations.16 What we find are new forms of property in 
which the qualities of private and public are dissolved, interwoven, and 
recombined. Property in East European capitalism is recombinant prop- 
erty, and its analysis suggests the emergence of a distinctively East Euro- 
pean capitalism that will differ as much from West European capitalisms 
as do contemporary East Asian variants. 
15 In a related path dependent hought experiment: Imagine two mixed economies 
each with half the firms fully public and half the firms fully private. The first arrived 
at that sectoral mix from a starting point of only public firms. The other, from a 
starting point of only private firms. Are their dynamics likely to be the same? 
16 It was not the aim of this article to produce a definitive test of the relative weights 
of public, private, and recombinant zones in the postsocialist mixed economy. To do 
so, we will need organizational surveys, conducted in close conjunction with detailed 
enterprise-level field investigations toyield more refined and nuanced categories and 
measures. 
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The concept of a postsocialist mixed economy is a useful first approxi- 
mation of an East European capitalism. But its essentialist categories of 
"public" and "private" (and the related dualisms of "market" and 
"redistribution")-even when opened up to the possibility of being 
mixed together in the same organizational setting-may be more limiting 
than illuminating. 
For decades, capitalism was defined vis-a-vis socialism and vice versa. 
Their systematic omparison enriched our understanding of both, but 
the "methods of mirrored opposition" and similar constructs (Stark 1986; 
Szelenyi 1978, 1988) that worked with these dualisms are no longer fruit- 
ful. The demise of socialism challenges that analytically forced choice, 
and it offers an opportunity for enriching comparative institutional analy- 
sis. When we stop defining capitalism in terms of socialism, we see that, 
in our epoch, capitalism as a construct is only analytically interesting 
in the plural: capitalisms must be defined and compared vis-a-vis each 
other. 
Diversity 
Our first analytic shift, therefore, must be from the conceptual tools 
around the concept of mixture to those around that of diversity. Capital- 
isms are diverse, and that diversity is manifested in forms that cannot 
be adequately conceptualized as mixtures of capitalism and socialism.17 
By analyzing recombinant property not only as the dissolution and inter- 
weaving of elements of public and private but also as a blurring of organi- 
zational boundaries in networks of interlocking ownership, we can es- 
cape, for example, the terms of the debate about whether the "lessons 
of East Asia for Eastern Europe" are the virtues of neoliberalism or of 
neostatism (World Bank 1993; Amsden 1994). Instead we join economic 
sociologists who are studying the East Asian economies from a network- 
centered approach in which not markets, nor states, nor isolated firms, 
but social networks are the basic units of analysis (Gereffi 1994; Hamil- 
ton, Zeile, and Kim 1990; Hamilton and Feenstra 1995). In this perspec- 
tive, the ability of the East Asian economies to adapt flexibly to changes 
in world markets rests in the interlocking ties characteristic of corporate 
17 My argument, thus, bears no resemblance to "third road" solutions (i.e., the mis- 
taken notion that there could be some combination of the best features of capitalism 
with the best features of socialism), and it follows that I am not arguing that recombi- 
nant property is a "best way." As people living in East Central Europe have known 
for decades if not centuries, all the best roads to capitalism started somewhere lse. 
I am reminded of the joke in which an Irishman in the far countryside is asked, 
"What's the best way to get to Dublin?" He thinks for a minute, and responds, 
"Don't start from here." 
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groups (Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991; Granovetter 1995), whether 
these be the patterns of mutual shareholding within the Japanese keiretsu 
(Gerlach and Lincoln 1992; Hoshi 1994); the ties of family ownership 
within the more vertically integrated South Korean chaebol (Kim 1991; 
Hamilton and Feenstra 1995); the social ties of the more horizontally 
integrated Taiwanese quanxiqiye "related enterprises" (Numazaki 
1991); or the dense ties that transgress organizational boundaries in the 
"buyer-driven" and "producer-driven" networks in Hong Kong, Singa- 
pore, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Gereffi 1994). 
These recent studies of the social embeddedness and local organiza- 
tional innovation characteristic of East Asian corporate networks uggest 
that the strategic hoice is not plans or markets, or even clans or markets, 
but clans for markets. Market orientation must be distinguished from 
market coordination: a broad variety of institutions of nonmarket coordi- 
nation are compatible with high performance market orientation (Schmit- 
ter 1988; Boyer 1991; Bresser Pereira 1993). Many of the most successful 
forms of network coordination in East Asia, moreover, appeared to early 
observers as highly improbable forms whose atavistic features could not 
possibly survive beyond the period of postwar reconstruction from which 
they arose. 18 Our point of departure, it should be clear, however, is not 
to look to Eastern Europe to find Hungarian keiretsu or Czech chaebol. 
Instead of searching for direct counterparts, East Asian/East European 
comparisons will yield new concepts when we grasp the specificity of the 
regional variants by explaining the differences among the various coun- 
tries within a region.'9 
Future research must examine whether the East European corporate 
networks are becoming successfully oriented to the world market. But it 
is not too early to pose analytic dimensions along which we could assess 
the potential for recombinant property to contribute to economic devel- 
opment. 
18 Incongruity, initself, neither insures urvival nor condemns an organizational form 
to an early death. Kim's (1991) discusion of the combinatory logic of the formation 
of the chaebol in Korea immediately following World War II invites comparison 
with the formation of recombinant s ructures during the contemporary period of East 
European reconstruction. 
19 Stark and Bruszt (1995), e.g., compare corporate networks in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. They find that Hungarian networks are formed predominantly 
through enterprise to enterprise links, sometimes involving banks yet absent ties be- 
tween banks and intermediate-level institutions such as investment companies. In the 
Czech Republic, by contrast, ownership networks are formed predominantly through 
ties at the meso level in the cross ownership of banks and large investment funds, 
but direct ownership connections among enterprises themselves are rare. Whereas 
Hungarian networks are tightly coupled at the level of enterprises but loosely coupled 
at the meso level, Czech networks are loosely coupled at the level of enterprises and 
tightly coupled at the meso level. 
1018 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Fri, 06 Mar 2015 18:10:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium: Stark 
One starting point, ready-at-hand from the burgeoning literature on 
the "transitional" economies, would be to ask, Do they contribute to 
creative destruction? That litmus test is based on a widely held assump- 
tion that economic development will be best promoted by "allowing the 
selection mechanism to work" through bankruptcies of underperforming 
enterprises. Recombinant property would not receive an unambiguously 
positive score measured by this standard. Indeed, the kinds of interenter- 
prise ownership described above are classic risk-spreading and risk- 
sharing devices that mitigate differences across firms. By dampening the 
performance of the stronger and facilitating the survival of the weaker 
firms in the interfirm networks, they might even impede creative destruc- 
tion in the conventional sense. 
But there is some question that a tidal wave of mass bankruptcies is 
a long-term cure for the postsocialist economies. With the catastrophic 
loss of markets to the East and with the stagnation of the economies of 
potentially new trading partners to the West, the depth and length of the 
transformational crisis in East Central Europe now exceeds that of the 
Great Depression of the interwar period (Kornai 1993b). In such circum- 
stances, an absolute hardening of firms' budget constraints not only 
drives poorly performing firms into bankruptcy but also destroys enter- 
prises that would otherwise be quite capable of making a high perfor- 
mance adjustment (see esp. Cui 1994). Wanton destruction is not creative 
destruction, goes this reasoning, and recombinant property might save 
some of these struggling but capable firms through risk-sharing networks. 
Along this line of reasoning, we would want to assess whether the sacri- 
fice in allocative efficiency by retarding bankruptcy is being offset by the 
preservation of assets with real potential for high performance in a situa- 
tion of economic recovery. 
A related, but analytically separate, point is that risk spreading can 
be a basis for risk taking. Extraordinarily high uncertainties of the kind 
we see now in the postsocialist economies can lead to low levels of invest- 
ment with negative strategic omplementarities (as when firms forgo in- 
vestments because they expect a sluggish economy based on the lack 
of investments by others). By mitigating disinclinations to invest, risk 
spreading might be one means to break out of otherwise low-level equilib- 
rium traps.20 Firms in the postsocialist transformational crisis are like 
mountain climbers assaulting a treacherous face, and the networks of 
interenterprise ownership are the safety ropes lashing them together. 
Neoliberals who bemoan a retarded bankruptcy rate fail to acknowledge 
20 On strategic complementarities in the postsocialist economies ee especially Litwack 
(1994). Hirschman (1958) provides the classic statement on low-level equilibrium traps 
and the importance of risk spreading for economic development. 
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that there might be circumstances when this mutual binding is a precon- 
dition for attempting a difficult ascent. Along this line of reasoning, we 
would want to assess whether the opportunities for risk shedding in the 
Hungarian setting can be offset when networks (rather than "develop- 
mental states" [Evans 1992]) perform disequilibrating functions that fa- 
cilitate and stimulate entrepreneurial risk taking. 
Economic development in East Central Europe does require more exit 
(some, indeed many, firms must perish) and more entry as well. But for 
destruction to be creative, these deaths must be accompanied by births 
not simply of new organizations but of new organizationalforms. Organi- 
zational forms are specific bundles of routines, and the reduction of their 
diversity means the loss of organized information that might be of value 
when the environment changes (Hannan 1986; Boyer 1991; Stark 1989, 
1992). From this perspective, an economy that maximized allocative effi- 
ciency (by putting all resources in the most efficient form) would sacrifice 
adaptive efficiency. Socialism, in this view, failed not only because it 
lacked a selection mechanism to eliminate organizations that performed 
poorly but also because it put all its economic resources in a single organi- 
zational form-the state enterprise. Socialism drastically reduced organi- 
zational diversity and in so doing prohibited a broad repertoire of orga- 
nized solutions to problems of collective action. Along this line of 
reasoning, an assessment of forms of recombinant property in an East 
European capitalism should start not by testing whether they reproduce 
state socialism or harbor real private property but whether they contrib- 
ute to adaptive efficiency. 
For the property rights school, it is not destruction (bankruptcy) nor 
diversity but the clarity of property rights that will yield the right set 
of incentives to make restructuring in the postsocialist transformation 
performance nhancing. Instead of reassigning property rights to an 
owner (an ironic legacy of an essentially Marxist notion of property), this 
school argues that property can be productively "dis-integrated" (Grey 
1980) such that different actors can legitimately claim rights to different 
aspects and capacities of the same thing (Hart 1988; Comisso 1991). But 
however disaggregated, property rights must be clarified if accountability 
is to be insured. Walder (1994), the leading proponent of this perspective 
in the postsocialist debate, for example, shows that it is not the privatiza- 
tion of assets but the clarification of property rights that has contributed 
to the dynamism of township and village enterprises in Chinese light 
industry. 
Along this line of reasoning, we should assess whether recombinant 
property is leading to well-defined property rights. The initial evidence 
presented in this article suggests that recombinant property would fail 
such a test. But from another perspective in the debate over property 
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rights, the blurring of enterprise boundaries might be a viable strategy 
to promote organizational flexibility, On the basis of research in advanced 
manufacturing fields in Germany and the United States, Sabel (1990) and 
Kogut, Shan, and Walker (1992) demonstrate that under conditions of 
extreme market volatility or of extraordinarily rapid technological 
change, economic actors engage in hedging strategies vis-a-vis other or- 
ganizations (partners or competitors) in their organizational field. When 
the future is highly uncertain, it is far from clear at Tl whether your 
assets will be interdependent with mine at T2. In such situations, in 
addition to the dualism make or buy (hierarchy or market) there is an 
alternative-cooperate. Kogut observes that one manifestation of such a 
hedging strategy is cross-ownership (not simply among purchasers and 
suppliers but also among competitors), and he finds dense patterns of 
cross-ownership among competitors in the field of microprocessing where 
firms cannot be certain whose standards will be the industry standards 
in the next round. Sabel goes even further, arguing that, in cases of 
extremely complex asset interdependence, it is not clear-cut property 
claims (however dense the cross-ownership) but an ambiguity of property 
claims that provides flexible adaptation to the market. Sabel's argument 
departs radically from the property rights school: he is claiming that 
actors are not assigned different rights over different aspects of an asset 
but are making overlapping claims on the same aspect. This is ambiguous 
property, not disaggregated property. 
The hedging strategies and boundary blurring in postsocialist recon- 
struction, it seems, find counterparts in some of the technologically most 
highly sophisticated sectors of North American and West European capi- 
talism. Along the dimension of this line of reasoning, we should assess 
whether recombinant property is, in fact, contributing to flexibility and 
whether any gains that might so accrue are enough to offset he possible 
sacrifice of accountability. We reencounter this trade-off of adaptability 
and accountability as we turn from the issues of organizational diversity 
and property rights to the problem of heterogeneous legitimating prin- 
ciples. 
Complexity 
In restructuring assets, we might say that actors are "identifying" new 
resources, but this would suggest that the resource was simply hidden or 
underutilized and only needed to be uncovered. In fact, before recombin- 
ing resources, they must first redefine them. We call this ability to "re- 
cognize" the properties of persons and things organizational reflexivity. 
It cannot be derived from the ambiguity of property claims but is a 
function instead of the ambiguity of organizing principles. The key to 
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adaptability in this view is not simply the diversity of types of organiza- 
tions but the possibilities for cross-fertilization inside and across organiza- 
tions where multiply operative legitimating principles collide-or in Har- 
rison White's (1993) phrase, "values mate to change."'21 
Some might argue, of course, that multiple orders are fine-provided 
that each occupies a distinctly bounded domain. Such is the model of 
modernity in "modernization" theory: through differentiation, each do- 
main of society would develop as a separate autonomous subsystem with 
its own distinctive logic. Complexity in this view requires diversity but 
only as the juxtaposition of clearly bounded rationalities. Marxism, of 
course, has its own conception of complexity: the temporary overlap of 
mutually contradictory principles. Both modernization theory and Marx- 
ism are deeply grounded in the transition problematic. The noisy clash 
of orders is only temporary: the revolutionary moment for one, the pas- 
sage to differentiated domains in the other. 
If we break with this transition problem, we can escape from the 
impoverished conceptions of complexity in both Marxism and moderniza- 
tion theory. In the alternative conception offered here, complexity is the 
interweaving of multiple justificatory principles on the same domain 
space. That view, of course, shares with modernization theory the notion 
of distinctive domains-relatively autonomous fields of action (Bourdieu 
1990). And it shares with Marxism the notion of the collision of ordering 
principles. But unlike modernization theory, each domain is a site of 
heterogeneity; and unlike Marxism, that tension is not consolidated and 
then released in an all-encompassing revolutionary moment. The noisy 
clash of orders occurs throughout he social world, and it is not transient 
but ongoing-punctuated by relative, localized stabilizations but never 
equilibrium (Latour 1988). 
Postsocialist societies are entering this discordant world. To still that 
noisy clash by the ascendency of one accounting, with profitability as the 
sole metric and markets as the only coordinating mechanism, would be 
to duplicate the attempt of Communism, with its imposition of a unitary 
justificatory principle, a strict hierarchy of property forms, and a single 
coordinating mechanism. To replicate the monochrome with a different 
coloring would be to destroy the heterogeneity of organizing principles 
that is the basis of adaptability. 
As this account of recombinant property has demonstrated, postso- 
cialist societies are not lacking in heterogeneous organizing principles. 
The problem therefore is not a simple lack of accountability but an over- 
21 See esp. Grabher (1994) for a discussion of how rivalry of coexisting organizational 
forms contributes to reflexivity and adaptability. For related views on adaptability 
and complexity, see Landau (1969), Morin (1974), and Conrad (1983). 
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abundance of accountability: An actor who, within the same domain 
space, is accountable to every principle is accountable to none. The 
adaptability of modern capitalisms rests not simply in the diversity of 
organizations but in the organization of diversity: enough overlap of 
legitimating principles across domains to foster rivalry of competing ac- 
counts within domains and enough boundedness of rationalities to foster 
accountability. It is not in finding the right mix of public and private but 
in finding the right organization of diversity to yield both adaptability and 
accountability that postsocialist societies face their greatest challenge. 
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